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CHAPTER?
The Law of Neutrality
7.1 INTRODUCTION

T

he law of neutrality defines the legal relationship between nations engaged
in an anned conflict (belligerents) and nations not taking part in such
hostilities (neutrals). The law of neutrality serves to localize war, to limit the
conduct of war on both land and sea, and to lessen the impact of war on
.
. al commerce. 1
InternatJ.on
Developed at a time when nations customarily issued declarations of war
before engaging in hostilities? the law of neutrality contemplated that the
transition between war and peace would be clear and unambiguous. With the
advent of international efforts to abolish "war,,,3 coupled with the proliferation
of collective security arrangements and the extension of the spectrum of warfare
to include insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, 4 anned conflict is now seldom
accompanied by formal declarations of war. s Consequently, it has become
1. See McDougal & Feliciano 402; Williams, Neutrality in Modem Anned Conflicts: A
Survey of the Developing Law, 90 Mil. L. Rev. 9 (1980); Norton, Between the Ideology and the
Reality: The Shadow of the Law of Neutrality, 17 Harv. Int'l L.J. 249 (1976); Dinstein, War,
Aggression and Self-defense (2nd ed. 1994) at 25-30; Schindler, Commentary: Neutral Powers in
Naval War, in Ronzitti at 211-22; Green 264-67.
2. See Hague III, art. 1.
3. The Treaty for the Renunciation ofWar (Kellogg-Briand Pact), 27 August 1928, 46 Stat.
2343, T.S. No. 796, 2 Bevans 732, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (No. 2137», and the U.N. Charter, were
designed to end the use offorce to settle disputes between nations and eliminate war. On this basis,
the International Law Commission refused, at the beginning ofits activities, to deal with the law of
armed conflict:
War having been outlawed, the regulation ofits conduct has ceased to be relevant....
If the Commission, at the very beginning ofits task, were to undertake this study,
public opinion might interpret its action as showing lack of confidence in the
efficiency ofthe means at the disposal ofthe United Nations for maintaining peace.
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm., 1949, at 281. Wars having continued to occur, nations and various
non-governmental entities (i.e., International Committee of the Red Cross (JCRC» have
continued to develop the law of armed conflict.
4. See Sarkesian, The New Battlefield: The United States and Unconventional Conflicts
(1986); Special Operations in U.S. Strategy (Barnett, Tovar & Shultz eds. 1984); Asprey, War in
the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History (1975); Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency:
The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (1966); ColI, Ord & Rose.
5. Paragraph 4.1 & note 3 thereunder (p. 249); paragraph 5-1, note 4 (p. 290); Greenwood,
The Concept of War in Modem International Law, 36 Int'l & Compo L.Q. 283 (1987); Green
69-72.
The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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increasingly difficult to detennine with precision the point in time when
hostilities have become a "war,,6 and to distinguish belligerent nations from
neutrals? Notwithstanding these uncertainties, the law of neutrality continues
to serve an important role in containing the spread of hostilities, in regulating the
conduct ofbelligerents with respect to nations not participating in the conflict, in
regulating the conduct of neutrals with respect to belligerents, and in reducing
the harmful effects of such hostilities on international commerce. 8
For purposes of this publication, a belligerent nation is defined as a nation
engaged in an international armed conflict, whether or not a formal declaration
of war has been issued. 9 Conversely, a neutral nation is defined as a nation that
has proclaimed its neutr<J.lity or has otherwise assumed neutral status with respect
. confli ct. 10
to an ongomg

6. See Greenwood id., generally. The traditional rule is that the law of neutrality regulating
the behavior ofneutrals and belligerents depends on the existence ofa state ofwar, and not merely
an outbreak of armed conflict. Tucker 199-202; Greenwood id. 297-301.
7. See papagraph 7.2, note 13 (po 368), Tucker 196-99 and Greenwood, note 5 (po 365) at
298-99.
8. See McNeill, Neutral Rights and Maritime Sanctions: the Effects of Two Gulf Wars, 31
Va. J. Ind L. 631 (1991); and Robertson, Interdiction ofIraqi Maritime Comnmerce in the
1990-1991 Persian Gulf Conflict, 22 Ocean Dev. & Int'lL. 289 (1991). On 8July 1996, the I.C.].
stated that:
The Court finds that as in the case of the principles of humanitarian law applicable in
armed conflict, international law leaves no doubt that the principle of neutrality,
whatever its content, which is of a fundamental character similar to that of the
humanitarian principles and rules, is applicable (subject to the relevant provisions of
the United Nations Charter), to all international armed conflict, whatever type of
weapons might be used.
Legality ofthe Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.]. 8 Jul1996, reprinted in
35 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 809 (1996) at para. 89. Compare Janis, Neutrality, in Robertson at 148-55.
Compare also Wright, 1968 Proc. Am. Soc. Int'l L. 79, who argues that "neutrality in principle
cannot exist" within the context of the United Nations Charter.
9. See Greenwood, note 5 (po 365) at 295-96. Compare Common article 2 of the Geneva
Conventions which "apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may
arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not
recognized by one of them."
10. NWIP 10-2, para. 230a; Kelsen 141-44; Tucker196-197. Greenwoodcorrecdystates that
"the law of neutrality is brought into operation by the acts of the neutral States, not the
belligerents." Greenwood note 5 (po 365) at 301. For example, the United States consistendy
proclaimed its neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War of1980-1988. President Carter, Remarks, 24 Sep.
1980, 16 Weekly Compo Pres. Docs. 1922 (1980); President Reagan, Written Responses to
Questions, 23 Weekly Compo Pres. Docs. 556 (19 May 1987); U.S. Dep't ofState, U.S. Policy in
the Persian Gulf, Special Report No. 166,July 1987, at 8-11. The San Remo Manual (para. 13(d»
provides simply that "'neutral' means any State not party to the conflict." See also Doswald-Beck at
87-88 for commentary on this definition.
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7.2 NEUTRAL STATUS
Customary intemationallaw contemplates that all nations have the option to
refrain from participation in an armed conflict by declaring or otherwise
11
assuming neutral status. The law of armed conflict reciprocally imposes duties
and confers rights upon neutral nations and upon belligerents. The principal
right of the neutral nation is that of inviolability; its principal duties are those of
abstention and impartiality. Conversely, it is the duty of a belligerent to respect
the former and its right to insist upon the latter. 12 This customary law has, to
11. The choice is a political decision. Similarly, recognition ofsuch nonparticipation is also a
political decision. NWIP 10-2, para. 230a. Although it is usual, on the outbreak ofanned conflict,
for nonparticipating nations to issue proclamations of neutrality, a special declaration by
nonparticipating nations of their intention to adopt a neutral status is not required. NWIP 10-2,
para. 231. Hague III, article 2, obligates belligerents to infonn neutrals of the existence ofa state of
war:
The existence ofa state ofwar must be notified to the neutral Powers without delay,
and shall not take effect in regard to them until after the receipt of a notification,
which may, however, be given by telegraph. Neutral Powers, nevertheless, cannot
rely on the absence of notification if it is clearly established that they were in fact
aware of the existence of a state of war.

Art. 2 is binding between a belligerent nation which is a party to Hague III and neutral nations
which also are parties to the Convention. Parties include the United States and many ofits allies,
the fonner-Soviet Union, and five of the internationally recognized or self-proclaimed pennanent
neutral nations e.g., Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland.
12. Tucker 202-18, esp. n.14. Impartiality obligates neutral nations to fulfill their duties and to
exercise their rights in an equal (i.e., impartial or non-discriminatory) manner toward all
belligerents, without regard to its differing effect on individual belligerents. Tucker 203-05; Hague
XIII, Preamble and art. 9. Abstention is the neutral's duty to abstain from furnishing belligerents
with certain goods or services. Tucker 206-18; Hague XIII, art. 6. Neutral duties also include
preventioll and acquiescence. The neutral has a duty to prevent the commission of certain acts by
anyone within its jurisdiction, e.g., to prevent belligerent acts of hostility in neutral waters, or the
use of neutral ports and waters as a base of operations. Tucker 218-53; Hague XIII, art. 8. The
neutral also has a duty to acquiesce in the exercise by belligerents of those repressive measures
international law permits the latter to take against neutral merchanttnen engaged in the carriage of
contraband, breach or attempted breach of blockade, or in the perfonnance of unneutral service.
Tucker252-58; Green 260-62. The application ofthese concepts in discussed in the balance ofthis
Chapter. See Figure A7-1 (p. 400) for a representation of the reciprocal rights and duties ofneutrals
and belligerents.
A nation may be neutral, insofar as it does not participate in hostilities, even though it may not be
impartial in its attitude toward the belligerents. Whether or not a position ofnonparticipation can
be maintained, in the absence ofcomplete impartiality, depends upon the reaction ofthe aggrieved
belligerent. NWIP 10-2, para. 230b n.14; Tucker 197 ("the only essential condition for neutral
status is that ofnon-participation in hostilities"). However the Kellogg-Briand Pact (paragraph 7.1,
note 3 (p. 365» has been interpreted to permit benevolent neutrality on behalf of victirus of
aggression.
(continued...)
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some extent, been modified by the United Nations Charter (see paragraph
7.2.1).
Neutral status, once established, remains in effect unless and until the neutral
13
nation abandons its neutral stance and enters into the conflict.
7.2.1 Neutrality Under the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter of
the United Nations imposes upon its members the obligation to settle
international disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of
force in their international relations. 14 In the event of a threat to or breach of the
peace or act of aggression, the Security Council is empowered to take
enforcement action on behalf of all member nations, including the use of force,
in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. 15 When called
12.(... continued)
On the other hand, the fact that a neutral uses force to resist attempts to violate its neutrality does
not constitute participation in the hostilities. Hague XIII, art. 26; Levie, 2 The Code of
International Armed Conflict 788; 11 Whiteman 185-90. That nations retain their right of
self-defense to enforce maintenance of their neutrality is illustrated by actions of neutral nations in
escorting neutral ships in the Persian Gulfduring the Iran-Iraq tanker war (1984-88), including the
United States policy ofproviding assistance upon request of other neutral flag vessels coming under
unlawful attack by belligerent ships or aircraft. See Dep't St. Bull., July 1988, at 61; McNeill,
paragraph 7.1, note 8 (p. 366), at 638; and De Guttry & Ronzitti, The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988)
and the Law of Naval Warfare (1993) at 173-209. See also the discussion of distress assistance in
paragraph 3.10.2, note 45 (p. 230).
13. Tucker 202; NWIP 10-2, para. 231, n.16. When the United States is a belligerent, designation
of the neutral status of third nations will ordinarily be promulgated by appropriate directives.
To be distinguished from self-proclaimed neutrals - either "permanent" or temporarily during an
armed conflict - are the two nations currently enjoying internationally recognized permanent
neutrality: Switzerland and Austria. 1 Whiteman 342-64. The self-proclaimed (alliance-free)
neutrals include Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and the Vatican (Holy See). See Wachtmeister,
Neutrality and International Order, Nav. War C. Rev., Spring 1990, at 105. On 15 September
1983, Costa Rica proclaimed a policy of "permanent, active and unarmed neutrality" while
maintaining its status as a party to the OAS and the 1947 Rio Treaty. N.Y. Times, 18 Nov. 1983, at
A12.
14. U.N. Charter, arts. 2(3) & 2(4). See also paragraphs 4.1.1 (p. 250) and 7.2.2 (p. 370).
15. U.N. Charter, arts. 39, 41-42; paragraph 4.1.1, note 8 (p. 251). U.N.S.C. Resolutions
SI1501 (1950), S11511 (1950), and S/1588 (1950), adopted by the Security Council upon the
occasion of North Korea's invasion of South Korea on 24 June 1950, detetrnined that North
Korea's aggression constituted a "breach of peace," recommended that member nations "furnish
such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack,"
recommended that such forces and assistance be made available to a "unified commander under the
United States," and authorized that unified command to use the U.N. Flag "in the course of
operations against North Korean forces." These Resolutions were adopted during the Soviet
Union's self-imposed absence from Security Council proceedings. Upon the Soviet Union's
return, its veto prevented the Council from taking further action. Thereafter, the General
Assembly, having determined that the Security Council was unable (due to the threat of a Soviet
veto) to "discharge its responsibilities on behalfofall the Member States," adopted the "Uniting for
Peace Resolution" of3 November 1950 which:
(continued...)
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upon by the Security Council to do so, member nations are obligated to provide
assistance to the United Nations, or a nation or coalition of nations
implementing a Security Council enforcement action, in any action it takes and
to refrain from aiding any nation against whom such action is directed. 16
Consequently, member nations may be obliged to support a United Nations
action with elements of their armed forces, a result incompatible with the
abstention requirement of neutral status. 17 Similarly, a member nation may be
called upon to provide assistance to the United Nations in an enforcement action
not involving its armed forces and thereby assume a partisan posture inconsistent
with the impartiality required by the traditional law of neutrality. 18 Should the
Security Council determine not to institute an enforcement action, each United
Nations member remains free to assert neutral status. 19
15.(...continued)
Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the pennanent
members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace ... , the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately
with a view to making appropriate recommendations .... for collective action ....
U.N.G.A. Res. 377 (V) (1950) (reprinted in 13 Whiteman at 564-68, and in Stone at 282-84).
Thereafter, and as ofJuly 1997, the Security Council has adopted mandatory sanctions only five
times: against Southern Rhodesia (V.N.S.C. Res. S/232 (1966) (trade embargo under article 41),
12 Whiteman 394-95 and U.N.S.C. Res. S/253 (1968) (trade embargo expanded under Chapter
VII), 12 Whiteman 403-07»; against South Africa (U.N.S.C. Res. S/418 (1977) (arms embargo
under Chapter VII), 1977 Digest 934-36»; against Iraq (U.N.S.C. Res. S/661 (1990) (total
embargo under Chapter VII) (reprinted in 29 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 1325 (1990»; against Yugoslavia
(V.N.S.C. Res. S1713 (1991) (weapons and military equipment embargo under Chapter VII)
(reprinted in 31 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 1433 (1992»; and against Haiti (U.N.S.C. Res. S/841 (1993) (trade
embargo) (reprinted in 32 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 1206 (1993». The Iraqi sanctions are still in force.
16. U.N. Charter arts. 2(5), 25, 43 & 49; paragraph 4.1.1, note 8 (p. 251). For an excellent
discussion of this concept see Title V Report, App. 0, pp. 626-29.
17. U.N. Charter arts. 43 & 45; paragraph 4.1.1, note 8 (p. 251). See also Doswald-Beck at
155-56. Some States (e.g.,Jordan) continued to assert theirneuttality and even to trade with Iraq.
18. U.N. Charter arts. 41 & 49; paragraph 4.1.1, note 8 (p. 251).
19. Traditional concepts of neutral rights and duties are substantially modified when the
United Nations authorizes collective ac~on against an aggressor. Absent a Security Council
resolution to the contrary, nations may discriminate, and even resort to armed conflict in
self-defense, against a nation that is guilty ofan illegal armed attack. This follows from art. 51 ofthe
Charter which recognizes the "inherent right ofindividual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations .... " See paragraph 4.1.1, note 9 (p. 253).
Under the "Uniting For Peace" Resolution, U.N.G.A. Res. 377(V} (1950) (see note 15 (p. 256»,
the General Assembly of the United Nations may, in the event of a breach of the peace and the
inability of the Security Council to act due to a veto, make "appropriate recommendations to
members for collective measures, including ... the use of armed force when necessary .... " In
contrast to a binding Security Council decision, recommendations ofthe General Assembly do not
constitute legal obligations for the member nations. In sum, then, although members may
discriminate against an aggressor, even in the absence of any action on the part of the Security
Council, they do not have the duty to do so. In these circumstances, neuttality remains a distinct
possibility. NWIP 10-2, para. 232 n.17; Tucker 13-20, 171-80; Schindler, Neutral Powers in
Naval War, Commentary, in Ronzitti at 211.
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7.2.2 Neutrality Under Regional and Collective Self-Defense
Arrangements. The obligation in the United Nations Charter for member
nations to refrain from the threat or use offorce against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state is qualified by the right of individual and
collective self-defense, which member nations may exercise until such time as
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to restore international peace
and security. This inherent right of self-defense may be implemented
individually, collectively or on an ad hoc basis, or through formalized regional
and collective security arrangements. 20 The possibility of asserting and
maintaining neutral status under such arrangements depends upon the extent to
which the parties are obligated to provide assistance in a regional action, or in the
case of collective self-defense, to come to the aid of a victim of an armed attack.
The practical effect of such treaties may be to transform the right of the parties to
assist one of their number under attack into a duty to do so. This duty may
assume a variety of forms ranging from economic assistance to the commitment
of armed forces?l

7.3 NEUTRAL TERRITORy22
As a general rule of international law, all acts of hostility in neutral territory,
including neutral lands, neutral waters, and neutral airspace, are prohibited?3 A
neutral nation has the duty to prevent the use ofits territory as a place ofsanctuary
or a base of operations by belligerent forces of any side.24 If the neutral nation is
unable or unwilling to enforce effectively its right of inviolability, an aggrieved
belligerent may take such acts as are necessary in neutral territory to counter the
activities of enemy forces, including warships and military aircraft, making
unlawful use of that territory.25 Belligerents are also authorized to act in
20. See Kelsen, generally. The Charter recognizes regional collective security arrangements in
Chapter VIII, entitled "Regional Arrangements". See paragraph 4.1.1, note 9 (p. 253).
Each of the collective security treaties to which the United States is party refers to and expresses
recognition of the principles, purposes and/or jurisdiction of the United Nations. Art. 103 of the
U.N. Charter states:
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.
21. See NWIP 10-2, para. 233 n. 20.
22. The rules of neutral territory stated in paragraph 7.3 are customary in nature and were
codified in Hague XIII. NWIP 10-2, para. 441 & no. 26.
23. Hague V, art. 1; Hague XIII, art. 2. See Green 265-66.
24. Tucker 260-61; Hague V, art. 5. Cj. Hague XIII, art. 25. Resort to force by a neutral
nation to prevent violation ofits territory by a belligerent does not constitute an act of hostility.
Hague V, art. 10.
25. McDougal & Feliciano 406-07; NWIP 10-2, para. 441 & n. 27; Tucker 220-26,256,
261-62; Harlow, UNCLOS III and Conflict Management in Straits, 15 Ocean Dev. & Int'l L. 197,
(continued ...)
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self-defense when attacked or threatened with attack while in neutral territory or
when attacked or threatened from neutral territory.26

7.3.1 Neutral Lands. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or war
materials and supplies across neutral land territory.27 Neutral nations may be
required to mobilize sufficient armed forces to ensure fulfillment of their
28
responsibility to prevent belligerent forces from crossing neutral borders.
Belligerent troops that enter neutral territory must be disarmed and interned
29
until the end of the armed conflict.
A neutral may authorize passage through its territory of wounded and sick
belonging to the armed forces of either side on condition that the vehicles
transporting them carry neither combatants nor materials of war. If passage of
sick and wounded is permitted, the neutral nation assumes responsibility for
providing for their safety and control. Prisoners of war that have escaped their
captors and made their way to neutral territory may be either repatriated or left at
liberty in the neutral nation, but must not be allowed to take part in belligerent
. .. w
hile th ere. 30
actIVltIes

7.3.2 Neutral Ports and Roadsteads. Although neutral nations may, on a
nondiscriminatory basis, close their ports and roadsteads to belligerents, they are
not obliged to do so.31 In any event, Hague Convention XIII requires that a
24-hour grace period in which to depart must be provided to belligerent
warships located in neutral ports or roadsteads at the outbreak of armed
conflict. 32 Thereafter, belligerent warships may visit only those neutral ports and
roadsteads that the neutral nation may choose to open to them for that

25.{... continued)
204 (1985); Robertson, The "New" Law of the Sea and the Law of Anned Conflict at Sea, in
Moore & Turner at 304.
26. Ibid. Compare San Rerno Manual paras. 22 & 30, and commentary in Doswald-Beck at
101-02 & 106-07.
27. Hague V, art. 2; FM 27-10, paras. 516-17. The various ways in which Sweden
responded to demands by Gennany in 1941 to transport troops and supplies to and from
Norway via Swedish territory is summarized in Levie, 1 The Code of International Anned
Conflict 156.
28. Hague V, art. 5; FM 27-10, para. 519b.
29. Hague V, art. 11; FM 27-10, paras. 532-36.
30. Hague V, arts. 13-14; FM 27-10, paras. 538-39, 541-43; Green 261-62.
31. NWIP 10-2, para. 443b(1) n. 29; Tucker 240. Cj. Hague XIII, art. 9.
32. Hague XIII, art. 13. For the most part, Hague XIII is considered as declaratory of the
customary rules restricting belligerent use of neutral ports and waters. Tucker 219. Those of its
provisions which are not so accepted are identified in the notes which follow. Even in relation to
neutral waters and ports, Hague XIII is not considered as being exhaustive. See Hague XIII, art. 1
and Tucker 219 n. 52.
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33
purpose. Belligerent vessels, including warships, retain a right of entry in
34
distress whether caused byforce majeure or damage resulting from enemy action.

7.3.2.1 Limitations on Stay and Departure. In the absence of special
provisions to the contrary in the laws or regulations of the neutral nation,35
belligerent warships are forbidden to remain in a neutral port or roadstead in
36
excess of 24 hours. This restriction does not apply to belligerent warships
devoted exclusively to humanitarian, religious, or nonmilitary scientific
37
purposes. (Warships engaged in the collection of scientific data of potential
38
military application are not exempt. ) Belligerent warships may be permitted by
a neutral nation to extend their stay in neutral ports and roadsteads on account of
stress of weather or damage involving seaworthiness. 39 It is the duty of the
neutral nation to intern a belligerent warship, together with its officers and crew,
that will not or cannot depart a neutral port or roadstead where it is not entided
. 40
to remam.
Unless the neutral nation has adopted laws or regulations to the contrary, 41 no
more than three warships of anyone belligerent nation may be present in the
42
same neutral port or roadstead at anyone time. When warships of opposing
belligerent nations are present in a neutral port or roadstead at the same time, not
less than 24 hours must elapse between the departure of the respective enemy
43
vessels. The order of departure is determined by the order of arrival unless an
44
extension of stay has been granted. A belligerent warship may not leave a
33. 11 Whiteman 265-69; Compare Hague XIII, art. 9.
34. NWIP 10-2, para. 443b(1) n. 29, quoting Naval War College, International Law Situations
1939, No. 39, at 43-44 (1940); Tucker 240 &252. The right ofentry in distress does not prejudice
the measures a neutral may take after entry has been granted. Under Hague XIII, art. 24(1), should
the belligerent vessel fail to leave port as soon as the cause ofentry is abated, the neutral is entitled to
take such measures as it considers necessary to render the ship incapable of taking to sea during the
war, i.e., to intern it. Levie, 2 The Code ofInternational Armed Conflict 816-17.
35. The practice of most neutral nations has been to adopt the 24 hour limit as the normal
period of stay granted to belligerent warships. NWIP 10-2, para. 443b(1) n. 29; Tucker 241 & n.
93.
36. Hague XIII, arts. 12-13; Tucker 241; San Remo Manual, para. 21. Paragraph 7.3.2.1 has
reference only to the stay ofbelligerent warships in neutral ports, roadsteads, or territorial sea-not
to passage through neutral territorial seas. Passage is discussed in paragraph 7.3.4 (p. 375).
37. See Hague XIII, art. 14(2).
38. This exception to the exemption from the limitations on stay and departure recognizes the
distinction between marine scientific research and military activities. Compare paragraph 1.5.2,
note 50 (p' 21).
39. Hague XIII, art. 14(1).
40. Hague XIII, art. 24; Tucker 242.
41. Hague XIII, art. 15; NWIP 10-2. art. 443b(2).
42. Hague XIII, art. 15.
43. Hague XIII, art. 16(1}.
44. Hague XIII, art. 16(2).

The Law of Neutrality

373

neutral port or roadstead less than 24 hours after the departure ofa merchant ship
of its adversary (Hague XIII, art. 16(3».

7.3.2.2 War Materials, Supplies, Communications, and Repairs.
Belligerent warships may not make use ofneutral ports or roadsteads to replenish
or increase their supplies of war materials or their armaments, or to erect or
employ any apparatus for communicating with belligerent forces. 45 Although
they may take on food and fuel, the law is unsetded as to the quantities that may
be allowed. In practice, it has been left to the neutral nation to determine the
conditions for the replenishment and refueling ofbelligerent warships, subject to
the principle of nondiscrimination among belligerents and the prohibition
against the use of neutral territory as a base of operations. 46
Belligerent warships may carry out such repairs in neutral ports and roadsteads
as are absolutely necessary to render them seaworthy. The law is unsetded as to
whether repair ofbatde damage, even for seaworthiness purposes, is permitted
under this doctrine. In any event, belligerent warships may not add to or repair
weapons systems or enhance any other aspect of their war fighting capability. It is
the duty of the neutral nation to decide what repairs are necessary to restore
seaworthiness and to insist that they be accomplished with the least possible
delay. 47
45. Hague XIII, arts. 5 & 18. Although Hague XIII, art. 5, addresses the erection of
communication apparatus, during World War II, practically all neutral nations prohibited the
employment by belligerents ofradiotelegraph and radiotelephone apparatus within their territorial
sea. NWIP 10-2, para. 443c n. 3l.
46. Hague XIII, art. 19; NWIP 10-2, para. 443d; Tucker 243. Art. 19 limits warships to "the
peace standard" of food, and, in practice, this standard has been adhered to generally by neutral
nations. However, the same art. 19 also establishes two quite different standards for refueling.
Warships may take on sufficient fuel "to enable them to reach the nearest port in their own
country," or they may take on the fuel "to fill up their bunkers built to carry fuel, when in neutral
countries which have adopted this method ofdetermining the amount offuel to be supplied." The
majority of neutral nations appear to have used the former standard, although it is evident that,
given the appropriate circumstances, either standard may easily permit warships to continue their
operations against an enemy. Para. 20(b) of the San Remo Manual would permit "replenishment
by a belligerent warship or auxiliary vessel ofits food, water and fuel sufficient to reach a port in its
own territory .... " Hague XIII, art. 20, forbids warships to renew their supply offuel in the ports
of the same neutral nation until a minimum period of three months has elapsed. NWIP 10-2, para.
443d n. 32; Tucker 243 n. 99.
47. Hague XIII, art. 17; NWIP 10-2, para. 443e. See also, San Remo Manual, para. 20(c).
Some nations have interpreted a neutral's duty to include forbidding, under any circumstances, the
repair of damage incurred in battle. Hence, a belligerent warship damaged by enemy fire that will
not or cannot put to sea once her lawful period of stay has expired, must be interned. However,
other nations have not interpreted a neutral's duty to include forbidding the repair of damage
produced by enemy fire provided the repairs are limited to rendering the ship sufficiendy
seaworthy to safely continue her voyage. Art. 17 would appear to allow either interpretation.
NWIP 10-2, para. 443e n. 33; Tucker 244-45. These views are illustrated in the case of the
German pocket battleship ADMIRAL GRAF SPEE:
(continued ...)
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7.3.2.3 Prizes. A prize (i.e., a captured neutral or enemy merchant ship) may only
be brought into a neutral port or roadstead because of unseaworthiness, stress of
weather, or want of fuel or provisions, and must leave as soon as such
circumstances are overcome or cease to prevail. 48 It is the duty of the neutral
nation to release a prize, together with its officers and crew, and to intern the
offending belligerent's prize master and prize crew, whenever a prize is unlawfully
brought into a neutral port or roadstead or, having entered lawfully, fails to depart
as soon as the circumstances which justified its entry no longer pertain. 49
7.3.3 Neutral Internal Waters. Neutral internal waters encompass those
waters of a neutral nation that are landward of the baseline from which the
territorial sea is measured, or, in the case of archipelagic states, within the closing

47.(... continued)
On December 13,1939, the Crq[Spee entered the Uruguayan port of Montevideo,
following an engagement with British naval forces. A request was made to the
Uruguayan authorities to permit the CrafSpee to remain fifteen days in port in order
to repair damages suffered in batde and to restore the vessel's navigability. The
Uruguayan authorities granted a seventy-two hour period ofstay. Shordy before the
expiration of this period the Crq[ Spee left Montevideo and was destroyed by its own
crew in the Rio de la Plata. The British Government, while not insisting that Article
17 of Hague XIII clearly prohibited the repair of batde damage, did point to the
widespread practice of States when neutral in forbidding the repair of batde damage
in their ports. In accordance with this practice it was suggested that the Craf Spee's
period ofstay be limited to twenty-four hours. Uruguay maintained, however, that
the scope of the neutral's duty required it only to prevent those repairs that would
serve to augment the fighting force of a vessel but not repairs necessary for safety of
navigation.
Tucker 245 n. 2. Tucker comments that this incident is "noteworthy as an example of the extent to
which belligerents seemingly can make use of neutral ports without violating the prohibition
against using neutral territory as a base of naval operations." Ibid. See O'Connell, The Influence of
Law on Sea Power (1975) at 27-30; Pope, The Batde of the River Plate (1956); and Bennett, Batde
of the River Plate (1972) for more detailed discussions of this and other aspects of the Batde of the
River Plate. See also Churchill, The Second World War (1948) at 7-5.
48. Hague XIII, arts. 21-22. There is a difference of opinion as to whether prizes may be kept
in neutral ports pending the decision ofa prize court. Hague XIII, art. 23, permits neutrals to allow
prizes into their ports "when they are brought there to be sequestrated pending the decision of a
Prize Court." The United States (as well as the United Kingdom and Japan) did not adhere to
article 23 and has maintained the contrary position. In 1916, the British steamship APPAM, seized
by a German raider, was taken into Hampton Roads under a prize crew. The U.S. Supreme Court
restored the vessel to her owners and released the crew on the basis that the United States would
not permit its ports to be used as harbors of safety in which prizes could be kept. TI,e Steamship
Appam, 243 U.S. 124 (1917). NWIP 10-2, para. 443fn. 34; Tucker 246-47.
49. Hague XIII, arts. 21-22; NWIP 10-2, para. 443£ Illustrative of these rules is the World
War II incident involving the CITY OF FLINT:
(continued...)
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lines drawn for the delimitation of such waters. 50 The rules ~oveming neutral
ports and roadsteads apply as well to neutral internal waters.
7.3.4 Neutral Territorial Seas. Neutral territorial seas, like neutral territory
generally, must not be used by belli~erent forces either as a sanctuary from their
enemies or as a base of operations. 5 Belligerents are obliged to refrain from all
49.(...continued)
On October 9th, 1939, the American merchant steamer City ofFlint was visited and
searched by a German cruiser at an estimated distance of 1,250 miles from New
York. The Flint, carrying a mixed cargo destined for British ports, was seized by the
German cruiser on grounds of contraband, and a German prize crew was placed on
board. Between the 9th ofOctober and the 4th ofNovember the American ship was
first taken to the Norwegian port of Tromsoe, then to the Russian city of
Murmansk, and then after two days in the last-named port, back along the
Norwegian coast as far as Haugesund where the Norwegian authorities on
November 4th released the Flint on the grounds of the international law rules
contained in articles XXI and XXII of Hague Convention XIII of 1907. Prizes may
be taken to a neutral harbor only because of an "inability to navigate, bad conditions
at sea, or lack of anchors or supplies." The entry of the Flint into Haugesund on
November 3 was not justified by the existence of anyone of these conditions. The
original visit and search and seizure ofthe Flint by the German warship, the placing of
the prize crew on board, and the conduct of that crew were apparendy all in accord
with law. The stay in the harbor of Murmansk, however, was of doubtful legality.
No genuine distress or valid reason for refuge in a so-called neutral harbor is evident
from the examination of the facts. Perhaps the Germans and the Russians hoped to
invoke the provisions ofArticle XXIII ofHague Convention XIII which authorizes
a neutral power to permit "prizes to enter its ports and roadsteads ... when they are
brought there to be sequestrated pending the decision of a prize court." This article
has never been accepted generally as a part of international law and was specifically
rejected by the United States in ratifying the convention. The situation was
complicated by the equivocal position of Soviet Russia which was not a neutral in
the traditional sense, in the European war. Under strict rules of international law the
U.S.S.R. was derelict in regard to its neutral duties and should not have permitted
the Flint either to enter Murmansk or to find any sort of a haven there.
U.S. Naval War College, International Law Situations 1939, No. 39 at 24-25 (1940), quoted in
NWIP 10.,.2, para. 443f n. 35. See also Tucker 246 n. 5; Hyde 2277-82.
50. See paragraph 1.4.1 (po 15).
51. See paragraph 7.3.2 (po 371).
52. Hague XIII, art. 5; NWIP 10-2, para. 442; Tucker 226-31. The prohibition against the use
ofneutral territorial waters as a sanctuary was at issue in the ALTMARK incident ofFebruary 1940
in which the German ship transporting British prisoners of war to Germany attempted to escape
capture by British warships by transiting south through the western Norwegian territorial sea and
ultimately being driven into Norwegian internal waters, the Jossingfjord, by a British naval
squadron. Over Norwegian objections, HMS COSSACK entered the fjord, boardedALTMARK
and released the prisoners of war. O'Connell, The Influence of Law on Sea Power 40-44 and
sources listed at 195; Tucker 234-39; 7 Hackworth 568-75; 3 Hyde 2339-40; MacChesney 6-48.
See also note 55 (po 376) and His Majesty's Stationery Office (H.M.S.O.) Cmd. 8012 (1950).
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acts of hostility in neutral territorial seas except those necessitated by self-defense
or undertaken as self-help enforcement actions against enemy forces that are in
violation of the neutral status of those waters when the neutral nation cannot or
will not enforce their inviolability.53
A neutral nation may, on a nondiscriminatory basis, suspend passage of
belligerent warships and prizes through its territorial seas, except in international
straits. When properly notified of its closure, belligerents are obliged to refrain
from entering a neutral territorial sea except to transit through international
54
straits or as necessitated by distress. A neutral nation may, however, allow the
"mere passage" of belligerent warships and prizes through its territorial seas. 55
While in neutral territorial seas, a belligerent warship must also refrain from
adding to or repairing its armaments or replenishing its war materials. 56
Although the general practice has been to close neutral territorial seas to
belligerent submarines, a neutral nation may elect to allow passage of
submarines. 57 Neutral nations customarily authorize passage through their
53. Hague XIII, art. 1; NWIP 10-2, para. 441 & n. 27; Tucker 219-20. The stated exception
reflects the reality that some neutrals either cannot or will not enforce the inviolability of their
territory. See also paragraph 7.3 and notes 25 & 26 thereunder (pp. 370-371).
54. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(3); 1982 LOS Convention, arts. 25(3) & 45(2); Scott,
Reports 847-48 (while leaving resolution of the question to the law of nations, "it seems that a
neutral State may forbid even innocent passage through limited parts ofits territorial waters so far as
that seems to it necessary to maintain its neutrality, but that this prohibition cannot extend to straits
uniting two open seas"); NWIP 10-2, para. 443a n. 28. See paragraphs 2.3.2.3 and 2.3.3.1 and
accompanying notes (pp. 119 & 121). See also paragraphs 7.3.5 and 7.3.6 (pp. 377 & 378) regarding
transit passage in neutral straits and archipelagic sea lanes passage through neutral archipelagic
waters, respectively.
55. Hague XIII, art. 10; NWIP 10-2, para. 443a. Tucker suggests that the phrase "mere
passage," appearing in Hague XIII, art. 10, should be interpreted by reference to Hague XIII, art.
5, which prohibits belligerents from using neutral waters as a base of operations. Tucker 232-39.
However, that interpretation is not universally held; Tucker 235 n. 84. MacChesney's
examination of the meaning of "mere passage" provides the following insights:
The legislative history provides no conclusive interpretation. The British who
introduced the phrase into their draft of [Article 10] indicated that innocent passage
in the peacetime sense was what they had in mind .... [T]he peace rime analogy
serves to indicate the type of passage that belligerents were willing to allow neutrals
to grant. The type ofpassage contemplated is limited by two basic criteria. It must be
an innocent passage for bona fide purposes of navigation rather than for escape or
asylum. The passage must also be innocent in the sense that it does not prejudice
either the security interests of the coastal State, or the interests of the opposing
belligerent in preventing passage beyond the type agreed to in Article X.
MacChesney 18-19. Para. 19 of the San Remo Manual eschews both "innocent" and "mere" in
describing transit of belligerent warships through neutral territorial waters using simply the term
"passage." See also the amplifying discussion in Doswald-Beck at 98 & 99.
56. Hague XIII, art. 18; Tucker 234 n. 81. See also paragraph 7.3.2.2 and notes 46 & 47
thereunder (p. 373).
57. Tucker 240 n. 89.
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territorial sea of ships carrying the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked, whether or
not those waters are otherwise closed to belligerent vessels. 58

7.3.4.1 The 12-NauticalMile Territorial Sea. When the law ofneutrality was
codified in the Hague Conventions of1907, the 3-nautical mile territorial sea was
the accepted norm, aviation was in its infancy, and the submarine had not yet
proven itselfas a significant weapons platform. The rules ofneutrality applicable to
the territorial sea were designed primarily to regulate the conduct of surface
warships in a narrow band of water off neutral coasts. 59 The 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention provides that coastal nations may lawfully extend the breadth of
60
claimed territorial seas to 12 nautical miles. The u.S. claims a 12-nautical mile
territorial sea and recognizes the right of all coastal nations to do likewise. 61
In the context of a universally recognized 3-nautical mile territorial sea, the
rights and duties of neutrals and belligerents in neutral territorial seas were
62
balanced and equitable. Although extension of the breadth of the territorial sea
from 3 to 12 nautical miles removes over 3,000,000 square miles of ocean from
the arena in which belligerent forces may conduct offensive combat operations
and significandy complicates neutral nation enforcement of the inviolability of
its neutral waters,63 the 12-nautical mile territorial sea is not, in and of itself,
incompatible with the law of neutrality. Belligerents continue to be obliged to
refrain from acts of hostility in neutral waters and remain forbidden to use the
territorial sea ofa neutral nation as a place ofsanctuary from their enemies or as a
64
base of operations. Should belligerent forces violate the neutrality of those
waters and the neutral nation demonstrate an inability or unwillingness to detect
and expel the offender, the other belligerent retains the right to undertake such
self-help enforcement actions as are necessary to assure compliance by his
adversary and the neutral nation with the law of neutrality.65
7.3.5 Neutral International Straits. Customary international law as reflected
in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention provides that belligerent and neutral
surface ships, submarines, and aircraft have a right of transit passage through,
58. Hague XIII, art. 14(2); Tucker 242.
59. Swarzttauber 32 & 116.
60. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 3.
61. See paragraph 1.2 (p. 2) and accompanying notes.
62. Harlow, The Law of Neutrality at Sea for the 80's and Beyond, 3 Pacific Basin LJ. 51
(1984).
63. Swarzttauber 240.
64. See Robertson, paragraph 7.3, note 25 (p. 370) at 278-80.
65. 2 O'Conne111156; NWIP 10-2, para. 441 & n. 27; Waldock, The Release ofthe Altmark's
Prisoners, 24 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 216, 235-36 (1947) (self-preservation). Tucker 262 n. 40 justifies
the British actions in the ALTMARK incident (paragraph 7.3.4, note 52 (p. 375» as a "reprisal
measure directed against Norway for the latter's refusal to carry out neuttal obligations."
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over, and under all straits used for international navigation. 66 Neutral nations
cannot suspend, hamper, or otherwise impede this right of transit passage
through international straits. 67 Belligerent forces transiting through
international straits overlapped by neutral waters must proceed without delay,
must refrain from the threat or use of force against the neutral nation, and must
otherwise refrain from acts of hostility and other activities not incident to their
transit. 68 Belligerent forces in transit may, however, take defensive measures
consistent with their security, including the launching and recovery of aircraft,
69
screen formation steaming, and acoustic and electronic surveillance.
Belligerent forces may not use neutral straits as a place ofsanctuary nor as a base of
operations, and belligerent warships may not exercise the belligerent right ofvisit
and search in those waters. 70 (Note: The Turkish Straits are governed by special
rules articulated in the Montreux Convention of 1936, which limit the number
and types of warships which may use the Straits, both in times of peace and
during armed conflict.) 71

7.3.6 Neutral Archipelagic Waters. The United States recognizes the right of
qualifying island nations to establish archipelagic baselines enclosing archipelagic
waters, provided the baselines are drawn in conformity with the 1982 LOS
Convention.72 The balance of neutral and belligerent rights and duties with
respect to neutral waters, is, however, at its most difficult in the context of
.
73
arc hi pe1agIc waters.

66. See paragraph 2.3.3.1 and accompanying notes (pp. 121 to 126).
67. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 44; paragraph 2.3.3.1 and note 42 thereto (p. 125); Tucker 232
& n. 80; San Remo Manual, para. 29.
68. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 39(1); paragraph 2.3.3.1 (p. 121). Neutral forces must similarly
conform to these requirements in the exercise of transit passage through straits.
69. For a discussion of the exercise ofself-defense in neutral straits see Harlow, paragraph 7.3,
note 25 (p. 370), at 206. See also paragraph 7.3.7 (p. 379); and San Remo Manual, para. 30. Neutral
forces similarly are entided to take such defensive measures in neutral straits.
70. See NWIP 10-2, para. 441; if. Hague XIII, art. 5; paragraph 7.3.4 (p. 375), and paragraph
7.6 & note 116 thereto (pp. 387-388). The belligerent right of visit and search is, of course, to be
distinguished from the warship's peacetime right of approach and visit (discussed in paragraph 3.4
(p. 221)) and to board in connection with drug-interdiction efforts (discussed in paragraph 3.11.2.2
(p.235)).
71. Convention Regarding the Regime of Straits (Montreux Convention) of20 July 1936,
173 L.N.T.S. 213, 31 Am.]. Int'l L. Supp. 4; paragraph 2.3.3.1 note 36 (p. 121). Special regimes
also apply to the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal and the Kiel Canal, all of which remain open to
neutral transit during armed conflict. See paragraph 2.3.3.1, note 36 (p. 121).
72. White House Fact Sheet, AnnexAl-8 (p. 83); paragraph 1.4.3 and note 41 thereto (p. 18).
73. The application of the customary rules ofneutrality to the newly recognized concept ofthe
archipelagic nation remains largely unsetded as a doctrine of international law. See Harlow,
paragraph 7.3, note 25 (p. 370) at 24-29; Robertson id. at 292-94.
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Belligerent forces must refrain from acts of hostility in neutral archipelagic
waters and from using them as a sanctuary or a base of operations?4 Belligerent
ships or aircraft, including submarines, surface warships, and military aircraft,
retain the right of unimpeded archi~elagic sea lanes passage through, over, and
under neutral archipelagic sea lanes. 5 Belligerent forces exercising the right of
archipelagic sea lanes passage may engage in those activities that are incident to
their normal mode of continuous and expeditious passage and are consistent
with their security, including formation steaming and the launching and
recover;, of aircraft?6 Visit and search is not authorized in neutral archipelagic
waters.
A neutral nation may close its archipelagic waters (other than archipelagic sea
lanes whether designated or those routes normally used for international
navigation or overflight) to the passage ofbelligerent ships but it is not obliged to
do so.78 The neutral archipelagic nation has an affirmative duty to police its
archipelagic waters to ensure that the inviolability of its neutral waters is
79
respected. If a neutral nation is unable or unwilling effectively to detect and
expel belligerent forces unlawfully present in its archipelagic waters, the
opposing belligerent may undertake such self-help enforcement actions as may
be necessary to terminate the violation of neutrality. Such self-help enforcement
may include surface, subsurface, and air penetration of archipelagic waters and
airspace and the use of proportional force as necessary. 80

7.3.7 Neutral Airspace. Neutral territory extends to the airspace over a neutral

nation's lands, internal waters, archipelagic waters (if any), and territorial sea. 81
82
Belligerent military aircraft are forbidden to enter neutral airspace with the
following exceptions:

74. SeeNWIP 10-2,para. 441; San Remo Manual,paras. 16 & 17; compare Hague XIII, arts. I,
2&5.
75. 1982 LOS Convention, arts. 53, 54 & 44; paragraph 2.3.4.1 and notes 47 & 48 (p. 127).
76. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 53(3); paragraph 2.3.4.1 (p. 127); San Remo Manual, para. 30.
77. Since visit and search is a belligerent activity unrelated to navigational passage, it cannot
lawfully be exercised in neutral territory; San Remo Manual, para. 16(d). Compare Hague XIII,
arts. 1 & 2. See NWIP 10-2, para. 441. The belligerent right of visit and search is, of course, to be
distinguished from the warship'S peacetime right ofapproach and visit (discussed in paragraph 3.4
(p. 221)) and to board in connection with drug-interdiction efforts (discussed in paragraph 3.11.2.2
(p.235)).
78. San Remo Manual, para. 19. Compare 1982 LOS Convention, arts. 52(2) & 54; Hague
XIII, art. 9; paragraph 2.3.4.1 (p. 127); compare paragraph 7.3.5 (p. 377).
79. San Remo Manual, para. 22. Compare Hague XIII, art. 25.
80. See NWIP 10-2, para. 441 n. 27; paragraph 7.3, note 25 (p. 370).
81. See paragraph 1.8 (p. 25); San Remo Manual, para. 14.
82. Art. 40, Draft 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare, The Hague, 19 February 1923,
reprillted in Am.]. lnt'l L., vol. 17 (1923), Supp., pp. 245-60 (although never having entered into
(continued ...)
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1. The airspace above neutral international straits and archipelagic sea lanes
remains open at all times to belligerent aircraft, including armed military aircraft,
engaged in transit or archipelagic sea lanes passage. Such passage must be
continuous and expeditious and must be undertaken in the normal mode offlight
of the aircraft involved. Belligerent aircraft must refrain from acts of hostility while
in transit but may engage in activities that are consistent with their security and the
83
security of accompanying surface and subsurface forces.
2. Medical aircraft may, with prior notice, overfly neutral territory, may land
therein in case of necessity, and may use neutral airfield facilities as ports of call,
subject to such restrictions and regulations as the neutral nation may see fit to apply
84
equally to all belligerents.
3. Belligerent aircraft in evident distress may be permitted to enter neutral airspace
and to land in neutral territory under such safeguards as the neutral nation may
wish to impose. The neutral nation must require such aircraft to land and must
85
intern both aircraft and crew.

7.3.7.1 Neutral Duties In Neutral Airspace. Neutral nations have an
affirmative duty to prevent violation of neutral airspace by belligerent military
aircraft, to compel offending aircraft to land, and to intern both aircraft and
crew. 86 Should a neutral nation be unable or unwilling to prevent the unlawful
entry or use ofits airspace by belligerent military aircraft, belligerent forces of the
other side may undertake such self-help enforcement measures as the
.
. 87
clrcumstances may reqUlre.
7.4 NEUTRAL COMMERCE
A principal purpose of the law of neutrality is the regulation of belligerent
activities with respect to neutral commerce. For purposes of this publication,
82.( ... continued)
force, the draft rules are generally regarded as declaratory ofcustomary law); NWIP 10-2, para. 444a;
Tucker 251; Spaight420-460. The practice in World Wars I and II was in generalconfonnity with
the rules stated in paragraph 7.3.7. Spaight 424. See also San Remo Manual, para. 18I.
83. See paragraphs 7.3.5 & 7.3.6 (pp. 377 & 378).
84. GWS-Sea, art. 40; GP I, art. 31; NWIP 10-2, para. 444a(1); Tucker 130-31; Spaight
443-44. See also San Remo Manual, paras. 182 & 183.
85. Hague V, art. 11; GP I, art. 31(4); Spaight 436-37; Tucker 252; AFP 110-31, para. 2-6c;
and San Remo Manual para. 18. See paragraph 7.11 and accompanying notes 168 & 169 (p. 399).
NWP 9, para. 7.3.74); NWP 9 (Rev. A), para. 7.3.7(4) and NWIP 10-2, para. 444b, provided that
while the neutral nation could intern belligerent aircraft and crews in such circumstances, they
were not obliged to do so, given the varied practice in WW II. Paragraph 7.3.7(3) has been revised
to reflect the prevailing view. See also paragraph 7.11 (p. 399).
86. NWIP 10-2, para. 444b; Tucker 251; San Remo Manual, para. 18.
87. AFP 110-31, para. 2-6c. See also paragraph 7.3 (p. 370).
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neutral commerce comprises all commerce between one neutral nation and
another not involving materials of war or armaments destined for a belligerent
nation, and all commerce between a neutral nation and a belligerent that does
not involve the carriage of contraband or otherwise contribute to the
belligerent's war-fighting/war-sustaining capability.88 Neutral merchant vessels
and nonpublic civil aircraft engaged in legitimate neutral commerce are subject
to visit and search, but may not be captured or destroyed by belligerent forces. 89
The law of neutrality does not ~rohibit neutral nations from engaging in
commerce with belligerent nations; 0 however, a neutral government cannot
itself supply materials of war or armaments to a belligerent without violating its
neutral duties ofabstention and impartiality and risking loss ofits neutral status. 91
Although a neutral may forbid its citizens from carryin<.fi on non-neutral
commerce with belligerent nations, it is not obliged to do so. In effect, the law
establishes a balance-of-interests test to protect neutral commerce from
unreasonable interference on the one hand and the right of belligerents to
interdict the flow of war materials to the enemy on the other. 93

7.4.1 Contraband. Contraband consists of goods which are destined for the
enemy of a belligerent and which may be susceptible to use in armed conflict.
Traditionally, contraband had been divided into two categories: absolute and
conditional. Absolute contraband consisted of goods whose character made it
obvious that they were destined for use in armed conflict, such as munitions,
weapons, uniforms, and the like. Conditional contraband is goods equally
susceptible to either peaceful or warlike purposes, such as foodstuffs,
construction materials, and fuel. 94 Belligerents often declare contraband lists at
88. Although war-sustaining conunerce is not subject to precise definition, conunerce that
indirectly but effectively supports and sustains the belligerent's war-fighting capability properly
fulls within the scope ofthe teon. See paragraph 8.1.1 & note 11 thereto (pp. 402 & 403). Examples
ofwar-sustaining conunerce include imports ofraw materials used for the production ofarmaments
and exports of products the proceeds of which are used by the belligerent to purchase arms and
armaments.
89. Visit and search is discussed in paragraph 7.6 (p. 387). The limited circumstances under
which capture and destruction of neutral merchant vessels and civil aircraft is permitted are
discussed in paragraph 7.10 (p. 396).
90. Hague XIII, art. 7.
91. See paragraphs 7.2 (p. 367) and 7.4.1 (p. 381); Hague XIII, art. 6; and Tucker 206-18.
92. Hague V, art. 7. For example, see the U.S. Neutrality Act, 18 V.S. Code 963 et seq., and the
ADDs Export Control Act, 22 V.S.C. 2271 et seq. See also Green 262-63.
93. 10 Whiteman 792, quoting an unofficial translation ofRousseau, Droit International Public
700-01 (1953). Iran's attacks on neutral ships carrying neutral conunerce during the 1984-88
Tanker War as herein defined upset that balance and were unlawful. Roach, Missiles on Target:
The Law of Targeting and The Tanker War, 82 Proc. Am. Soc. Int'l L. 154 (1988). See also
De Guttry & Ronzitti, note 12 (p. 367) at 128-29.
94. NWIP 10-2, art. 631a; Tucker 263. This distinction is expanded on in the following:
(continued...)
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the initiation of hostilities to notify neutral nations of the type of goods
considered to be absolute or conditional contraband as well as those not
considered to be contraband at all, i.e., exempt or "free goods." The precise
nature of a belli~erent' s contraband list may vary according to the circumstances
of the conflict.
The practice ofbelligerents since 1939 has collapsed the traditional distinction
between absolute and conditional contraband. 96 Because of the involvement of
94.(...continued)
There are, in the first place, articles which by their very character are destined to be
used in war. In this class are to be reckoned, not only arms and ammunition, but also
such articles of ambiguous use as military stores, naval stores, and the like. These are
termed absolute contraband. There are, secondly, articles which, by their very
character, are not necessarily destined to be used in war, but which, under certain
circumstances and conditions, can be of the greatest use to a belligerent for the
continuance of the war. To this class belong, forinstance, provisions, coal, gold, and
silver. These articles are termed conditional or relative contraband. ... [A]lthough
belligerents must be free to take into consideration the circumstances ofthe particular
war, as long as the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband is upheld
it ought not to be left altogether to their discretion to declare any articles they like to
be absolute contraband. The test to be applied is whether, in the special
circumstances of a particular war, the article concerned is by its character destined to
be made use offor military, naval, or air-fleet purposes because it is essential to those
purposes. If not, it ought not to be declared absolute contraband. However, it may
well happen that an article which is not by its very nature destined to be made use of
in war, acquires this character in a particular war and under particular circumstances;
and in such case it may be declared absolute contraband. Thus, for instance,
foodstuffi cannot, as a rule, be declared absolute contraband; but ifthe enemy, for the
purpose ofsecuring sufficient [foodstuffi] for his military forces, takes possession ofall
the foodstuffi in the country, and puts the whole population on rations, foodstuffi
acquire the character essential to articles ofabsolute contraband, and can therefore be
declared to be such.
2 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 801 & 803. See also Green 158. On starvation as an impermissible
method of warfare, see paragraph 8.1.2, note 15 (p. 404).
95. NWIP 10-2, art. 631 b, quoted with approvalinMcDougal & Feliciano 482-83; Green 158.
96. NWIP 10-2, art. 631b n.18; Tucker 266-67. O'Connell has correctly noted that "the
central principle is the actual commitment ofgoods to the prosecution ofwar, and it is obvious that
the principle is differentially applicable in different circumstances .... What is likely to occur in the
event of resuscitation of the law of contraband in future limited wars is a readjustment of the items
on the various lists." 2 O'Connell 1144. In December 1971, Pakistan and India each declared
contraband lists containing items traditionally considered to be absolute contraband. The lists are
reprinted in 66 Am. J. Int'l L. 386-87 (1972). Although neither Iran nor Iraq declared contraband
lists in their 1980-88 war, the fact that both nations attacked neutral crude oil carriers, loaded and in
ballast, indicated both Iran and Iraq regarded oil (as an export commodity) to be contraband since
oil and the armaments which its sale or barter on international markets brought were absolutely
indispensable to the war efforts of the Persian Gulfbelligerents. See Viorst, Iraq at War, 65 Foreign
Affairs 349, 350 (Winter 1986/87); Bruce, U.S. Request Stretches Iraq's Patience, 8 Jane's
Defence Weekly 363 (29 Aug. 1987); N.Y. Times, 4 Sep. 1986, atAl & All.
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virtually the entire population in support of the war effort, the belligerents of
both sides during the Second World War tended to exercise governmental
control over all imports. Consequendy, it became increasingly difficult to draw a
meaningful distinction between goods destined for an enemy government and
its armed forces and goods destined for consumption by the civilian populace. As
a result, belligerents treated all imports direcdy or indirecdy sustaining the war
effort as contraband without making a distinction between absolute and
conditional contraband. 97 To the extent that international law may continue to
require publication of contraband lists, recent practice indicates that the
requirement may be satisfied by a listing of exempt goods. 98

7.4.1.1 Enemy Destination. Contraband goods are liable to capture at any
place beyond neutral territory, if their destination is the territory belonging to or
occupied by the enemy. It is immaterial whether the carriage of contraband is
direct, involves transshipment, or requires overland transport. 99 When
contraband is involved, a destination of enemy owned or occupied territory may
be presumed when:
1. The neutral vessel is to call at an enemy port before arriving at a neutral port for
which the goods are documented
2. The goods are documented to a neutral port serving as a port of transit to an

enemy, even though they are consigned to a neutral
97. The San Remo Manual does not define contraband in tenns of it being absolute or
conditional. San Remo Manual, para. 148. See also the commentary on that paragraph in
Doswald-Beck at 215-16.
98. But see San Remo Manual, paras. 149 & 150 which would require publication of lists of
goods considered to be contraband; all else being "free goods" not subject to capture.
99. Tucker 267-68. Stone explains this rule as follows:
"Continuous voyage" is where, in order to obtain immunity during a part of its
voyage to the enemy port, the vessel breaks its journey at a neutral intermediate port,
the contraband being ostensibly destined there. At the neutral port, for appearance's
sake it may unload and reload the same contraband cargo, but in any case it then
proceeds with the cargo on the shortened span ofits journey to the enemy port. The
dOdrine of continuous voyage prescribes that such a vessel and its cargo are to be
deemed to have an enemy destination (and, therefore, to be liable to seizure) from
the time she leaves her home port. Similarly, "continuous transports" is where the
guilty cargo is unloaded at the neutral port, and is then carried further to the enemy
port or destination by another vessel or vehicle. The corresponding dOdrine of
continuous transports applies with similar effect, rendering the cargo liable to seizure
from the time it leaves its home port.
Stone 486. The principles underlying the so-called doctrines of "continuous voyage" and
"continuous transports" or "ultimate destination" were applied by prize courts in both World
Wars I and II. NWIP 10-2, para. 631c(1) n. 19. Development of the doctrine of continuous
voyage is succincdy discussed in 2 O'Connell 1146-47.
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3. The goods are consigned "to order" or to an unnamed consignee, but are
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These presumptions of enemy destination ofcontraband render the offending
cargo liable to seizure by a belligerent from the time the neutral merchant vessel
leaves its home or other neutral territory until it arrives again in neutral territory.
Although conditional contraband is also liable to capture if ultimately destined
for the use of an enemy government or its anned forces, enemy destination of
conditional contraband must be factually established and cannot be
presumed. 101

7.4.1.2 Exemptions to Contraband. Certain goods are exempt from capture
as contraband even though destined for enemy territory.l02 Among them are:

1. Exempt or "free goods,,103
2. Articles intended exclusively for the treatment ofwounded and sick members of
104
the anned forces and for prevention of disease
3. Medical and hospital stores, religious objects, clothing, bedding, essential
foodstuffi, and means ofshelter for the civilian population in general, and women
and children in particular, provided there is not serious reason to believe that such
goods will be diverted to other purpose, or that a definite military advantage would
accrue to the enemy by their substitution for enemy goods that would thereby
1 5
become available for military purposes 0
100. NWIP 10-2, art. 631c(1). The circumstances creating a presumption of ultimate
destination of absolute contraband here enumerated are of concern to the operating commander
for the reason that circumstances held to create a presumption of enemy destination constitute
sufficient cause for capture. Before a prize court, each of these presumptions is rebuttable and
whether or not a prize court will, in fact, condemn the captured cargo and vessel (or aircraft) will
depend upon a number of complex considerations with which the commander need not be
concerned. NWIP 10-2, para. 631c(1) n. 20. See also Green 158.
101. NWIP 10-2, art. 631c(2); Tucker 270-75. See paragraph 7.4.1.1, note 100 (p. 384).
Regarding capture of a vessel carrying contraband, see paragraph 7.10, note 153 (p. 396).
102. See Tucker 263.
103. NWIP 10-2, para. 631e(1) & n. 17.
104. GWS-Sea, art. 38; NWIP 10-2, para. 631e(2). The particulars concemingthe carriage of
such articles must be transmitted to the belligerent nation and approved by it.
105. GC, arts. 23 & 59; Tucker 265 n. 4. Fornations bound thereby, GP I, art. 70, modifies the
conditions ofGC, art. 23, that a nation may impose before permitting free passage of these relief
supplies. The United States supports the principle contained in GP I, art. 70. The Sixth Annual
American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian
Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the
1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 Am. UJ. Int'lL. & Policy 426 (1987) (remarks of U.S. Department
ofState Deputy Legal Adviser Matheson: the United States supports the principle reflected in GP I,
arts. 54 & 70, "subject to the requirements ofimperative military necessity, that impartial relief
actions necessary for the survival of the civilian population be permitted and encouraged").
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4. Items destined for prisoners of war, including individual parcels and collective
relief shipments containing food, clothing, medical supplies, religious objects, and
l06
educational, cultural, and athletic articles
5. Goods otherwise specifically exempted from capture by international
. or b
· a l arrangement b etween b elligerents. 107
convention
y specl

It is customary for neutral nations to provide belligerents of both sides with
information regarding the nature, timing, and route of shipments of goods
constituting exceptions to contraband and to obtain approval for their safe
.
b elligerent owne d or occuple
. d temtory.
.
108
cond uct an d entry IOto

7.4.2

Certificate of Noncontraband Carriage. A certificate of
noncontraband carriage is a document issued by a belligerent consular or other
designated official to a neutral vessel (navicert) or neutral aircraft (aircert)
certifying that the cargo being carried has been examined, usually at the initial
place of departure, and has been found to be free of contraband. The purpose of
such a navicert or aircert is to facilitate belligerent control of contraband goods
with minimal interference and delay of neutral commerce. The certificate is not
a guarantee that the vessel or aircraft will not be subject to visit and search or that
cargo will not be seized. (Changed circumstances, such as a change in status of
the neutral vessel, between the time ofissuance of the certificate and the time of
interception at sea may cause it to be invalidated.) Conversely, absence of a
navicert or aircert is not, in itself, a valid ground for seizure of cargo. Navicerts
and aircerts issued by one belligerent have no effect on the visit and search rights
109
ofa belligerent of the opposing side.
The acceptance ofa navicert or aircert by
. raft d oes not constItute
. "unneu tral servIce.
. " 110
a neu tral ship or alrc

7.5 ACQUIRING ENEMY CHARACTER

All vessels operating under an enemy flag, and all aircraft bearing enemy
markings, possess enemy character: However, the fact that a merchant ship flies a
106. The conditions that may be set on these shipments are set forth in arts. 72-75 and Annex
III ofGPW.
107. NWIP 10-2, para. 631e(3). See GC, arts. 23 & 59.
108. Compare GC, art. 23(4) and 4 Pictet 184.
109. See NWIP 10-2, para. 631d n. 22 and sources cited therein; 1 Medlicott, The Economic
Blockade (United Kingdom Official History of the Second World War, Civil Series) 94 & 95
(1952); Tucker 280-82, 312-15 & 322-23; McDougal & Feliciano 509-13; 2 O'Connell 1147-48;
Green 164. A sirnilarprocedure was used during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the United States
issued "clearcerts." Dep'tSt. Bull., 12 Nov. 1962, at 747; and Mallison, Limited Naval Blockade or
Quarantine-Interdiction: National and Collective Defense Claims Valid Under International
Law, 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 389-90 (1962). See also San Remo Manual, paras. 122-124.
110. "Unneuttal service" is discussed in paragraph 7.5.1, note 112 (p. 386).

386

Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations

neutral flag, or that an aircraft bears neutral markings, does not necessarily
establish neutral character. Any merchant vessel or civilian aircraft owned or
controlled by a belligerent possesses enemy character, regardless of whether it is
operating under a neutral flag or bears neutral markings. I I 1 Vessels and aircraft
acquiring enemy character may be treated by an opposing belligerent as if they
are in fact enemy vessels and aircraft. (Paragraphs 8.2.1 and 8.2.2 set forth the
actions that may be taken against enemy vessels and aircraft.)

7.5.1 Acquiring the Character of an Enemy Warship or Military
Aircraft. Neutral merchant vessels and civil aircraft acquire enemy
characterl12 and may be treated by a belligerent as enemy warships and military
aircraft when engaged in either of the following acts:
111. See NWIP 10-2, para. 501; Tucker 76-86; Green 162-63.
A neutral nation may grant a merchant vessel or aircraft the right to operate under its flag, even
though the vessel or aircraft remains substantially owned or controlled by enemy interests.
According to the international law of prize, such a vessel or aircraft nevertheless possesses enemy
character and may be treated as enemy by the concerned belligerent. In view of current
commercial practices, determination of true ownership or control may be difficult.
There is no settled practice among nations regarding the conditions under which the transfer of
enemy merchant vessels (and, presumably, aircraft) to a neutral flag legitimately may be made.
Despite agreement that such transfers will not be recognized when fraudulently made for the
purpose of evading belligerent capture or destruction, nations differ in the specific conditions that
they require to be met before such transfers can be considered as bonafide. However, it is generally
recognized that, at the very least, all such transfers must result in the complete divestiture of enemy
ownership and control. The problem of transfer is mainly the proper concern ofprize courts rather
than ofan operating naval commander, and the latter is entitled to seize any vessel transferred from
an enemy to a neutral flag when such transfer has been made either immediately prior to, or during,
hostilities. NWIP 10-2, para. 501 n. 5. Compare San Remo Manual, paras. 112-117. See also
Doswald-Beck at 187-95.
On the mid-1987 reflagging of eleven Kuwaiti tankers to U.S. registration, see Weinberger, A
Report to the Congress on Security Arrangements in the Persian Gulf, 26 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 1450-51
(1987); De Guttry & Ronzitti, paragraph 7.2, note 12 (p. 367), at 121-23.
112. NWIP 10-2, para. SOla; Tucker 319-21. Compare San Remo Manual, paras. 67 (neutral
merchant vessels) & 68 (neutral civil aircraft). With the exception of resistance to visit and search,
the acts defined here (and in examples 7 and 8 of paragraph 7.10 (p. 397» have been traditionally
considered under the heading of "unneutral service." Although originally established for and
applied to the conduct of neutral vessels, the rules regarding unneutral service have been
considered generally applicable to neutral aircraft as well.
The term "unneutral service" does not refer to acts performed by, and attributable to, a neutral
nation itsel£ Rather, it refers to certain acts which are forbidden to neutral merchant vessels and
civilian aircraft. Attempts to define the essential characteristics common to acts constituting
unneutral service have not been very satisfactory. However, it is clear that the types of unneutral
service which a neutral merchant vessel or civilian aircraft may perform are varied; hence, the
specific sanctions applicable for acts of unneutral service may vary. The services enumerated in
paragraph 7.s.1 are ofsuch a nature as to identify a neutral merchant vessel or civilian aircraft with
(continued ...)
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1. Taking a direct part in the hostilities on the side of the enemy
2. Acting in any capacity as a naval or military auxiliary to the enemy's armed
forces.
(paragraph 8.2.1 describes the actions that may be taken against enemy warships
and military aircraft.)

7.5.2 Acquiring the Character of an Enemy Merchant Vessel or Civil
Aircraft. Neutral merchant vessels and civil aircraft acquire enemy character
and may be treated by a belligerent as enemy merchant vessels or civil aircraft
when engaged in either of the following acts:

1. Operating directly under enemy control, orders, charter, employment, or
. 113'"'
di rectIon
2. Resisting an attempt to establish identity, including visit and search.114
(Paragraph 8.2.2 describes the actions that may be taken against enemy merchant
ships and civil aircraft.)

7.6 VISIT AND SEARCH
Visit and search is the means by which a belligerent warship or belligerent
military aircraft may determine the true character (enemy or neutral) of
merchant ships encountered outside neutral territory, the nature (contraband or
exempt "free goods") of their cargo, the manner (innocent or hostile) of their
115
employment, and other facts bearing on their relation to the armed conflict.

112.(...continued)
the anned forces of the opposing belligerent for whom these acts are performed, and, for this
reason, such vessels or aircraft may be treated in the same manner as enemy warships or military
aircraft. The acts identified in paragraph 7.5.2 (p. 387) involve neutral merchant vessels and aircraft
operating at the direction or under the control of the belligerent, but not in direct support of the
belligerent's anned forces. Such vessels and aircraft are assimilated to the position of, and may be
treated in the same manner as, enemy merchant vessels and aircraft. The acts of unneutral service
cited in paragraph 7.1 0 (examples 7 and 8) (p. 397) imply neither a direct belligerent control over,
nor a close belligerent relation with, neutral merchant vessels and aircraft. By custom, vessels
performing these acts, though not acquiring enemy character, are liable to capture. NWIP 10-2,
para. SOla n. 6; Tucker 318-21 & 355-56.
113. This would include neutral merchant vessels in belligerent convoy. See San Remo
Manual, para. 67(e).
114. NWIP 10-2, para. 501b; Tucker322-23. See paragraph 7.5.1, note 112 (p. 386).
115. Hague XIII, art. 2; Tucker 332-33; Green 163; San Remo Manual, para. 118. The
peacetime right of approach and visit is discussed in paragraph 3.4 (p. 221).
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Warships are not subject to visit and search. 116 The prohibition against visit and
. astraIts
l · over1appe d b y
. neutral tern.tory 117 extencis·
searc h m
to mternatlOn
118
neutral territorial seas and archipelagic sea lanes.
Neutral vessels engaged in
·
a
l
·
b
b·
.. an d searc h . 119
government noncommerCl servIce may not e su ~ecte d to VISIt
Neutral merchant vessels under convoy of neutral warships of the same
nationality are also exempt from visit and search, although the convoy
commander may be required to provide in writing to the commanding officer of
an intercepting belligerent warship information as to the character of the vessels
120
and of their cargoes which could otherwise be obtained by visit and search.
Should it be detennined by the convoy commander that a vessel under his charge
possesses enemy character or carries contraband cargo, he is obliged to withdraw
his protection of the offending vessel, makin~ it liable to visit and search, and
possible capture, by the belligerent warship.l 1

7.6.1 Procedure for Visit and Search. In the absence of specific rules of
.
.
122 Issue
.
d b y t h e operation
. al c h·
engagement or oth er speCI·al mstructIons
am 0 f
command during a period of armed conflict, the following procedure should be
carried out by U.S. warships exercising the belligerent right ofvisit and search:
1. Visit and search should be exercised with all possible tact and consideration.
2. Before sunmlOning a vessel to lie to, the warship should hoist its national flag.
The sununons is made by firing a blank charge, by international flag signal (SN or
116. Stone 591-92; 11 Whiteman 3. See also paragraph 2.1.2 (p. 110).
117. Hague XIII, art. 2; NWIP 10-2, para. 441.
118. Harlow, paragraph 7.3, note 25 (p. 370), at205-06, and 1982 LOS Convention, arts. 39 &
54. See paragraphs 7.3.5 (p. 377) and 7.3.6 (p. 378).
119. Oxford Manual, art. 32, Schindler & Toman 862; paragraph 2.1.3 (p. 112); but see Tucker
335-36 & n. 10.
120. This has been the consistent position of the United States which, while previously not
commonly accepted (NWIP 10-2, para. 502a & n. 10, Tucker 334-35) appears to have recently
achieved such acceptance. See San Remo Manual, para. 120(b). Certainly, the experience of the
convoying by several nations in the Persian Gulf during the tanker war between Iran and Iraq
(1984-1988) supports the U.S. position. See De Guttry & Ronzitti, paragraph 7.2, note 12 (p. 367)
at 105, 188-89 & 197. It is unsettled as to whether this rule would also apply to a neutral nerchant
vessel under convoy of a neutral warship of another flag. The San Remo Manual would apply it if
there exists an agreement to that effect between the flag State of the merchant vessel and the flag
State of the convoying warship. San Remo Manual, para. 120(b).
121. NWIP 10-2, para. 502a n. 10, quoting paras. 58-59 of the 1941 Tentative Instructions for
the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime and Aerial Warfare.
122. The issuance of certificates of noncontraband carriage are one example of special
instructions. See paragraph 7.4.2 (p. 385). The Visit and Search Bill, contained in paragraph
630.23.50fOPNAVINST 3120.32 (series), Standard Organization and Regulations of the U.S.
Navy, provides instructions which are to be implemented in conjunction with the guidance set
forth in this publication, including paragraph 7.6.1. See also Tucker 336-38.
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SQ), or by other recognized means. The summoned vessel, if a neutral merchant
ship, is bound to stop, lie to, display her colors, and not resist. (If the summoned
vessel is an enemy ship, it is not so bound and may legally resist, even by force, but
thereby assumes all risk of resulting damage or destruction.)
3. If the summoned vessel takes flight, she may be pursued and brought to by
forcible measures if necessary.
4. When a summoned vessel has been brought to, the warship should send a boat
with an officer to conduct the visit and search. If practicable, a second officer
should accompany the officer charged with the examination. The officer(s) and
boat crew may be armed at the disCT~tion of the commanding officer.
5. If visit and search at sea is deemed hazardous or impracticable, the neutral vessel
may be escorted by the summoning, or another, U.S. warship or by a U.S. military
aircraft to the nearest place (outside neutral territory) where the visit and search
may be conveniendy and safely conducted. The neutral vessel is not obliged to
lower her flag (she has not been captured; but must proceed according to the
orders of the escorting warship or aircraft. 23
6. The boarding officer should first examine the ship's papers to ascertain her
character, ports of departure and destination, nature of cargo, manner of
employment, and other facts deemed pertinent. Papers to be examined will
ordinarily include a certificate of national registry, crew list, passenger list,
logbook, bill ofhealth clearances, charter party (ifchartered), invoices or manifests
of cargo, bills oflading, and on occasion, a consular declaration or other certificate
of noncontraband carriage certifying the innocence of the cargo.
7. Regularity of papers and evidence of innocence of cargo, employment, or
destination furnished by them are not necessarily conclusive, and, should doubt
exist, the ship's company may be questioned and the ship and cargo searched.
8. Unless military security prohibits, the boarding officer will record the facts
concerning the visit and search in the logbook of the visited ship, including the
date and position of the interception. The entry should be authenticated by the
signature and rank of the boarding officer, but neither the name of the visiting
124
warship nor the identity of her commanding officer should be disclosed.

7.6.2 Visit and Search by Military Aircraft. Although there is a right ofvisit
and search by military aircraft, there is no established international practice as to
125
how that right is to be exercised.
Ordinarily, visit and search of a vessel by an
123. See Tucker 338-44.
124. See OPNAVINST 3120.32 (series), note 122 (p. 388).

125. NWIP 10-2,para.502n. 8,502b(5)&nn.14-15;Tucker333,355&n.62; 11 Whiteman 3-5.
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aircraft is accomplished by directing and escorting the vessel to the vicinity of a
belligerent warship, which will carry out the visit and search, or to a belligerent
port. 126 Visit and search of an aircraft by an aircraft may be accomplished by
directing the aircraft to froceed under escort to the nearest convenient
belligerent landing area. 12

7.7 BLOCKADE
7.7.1 General. Blockade is a belligerent operation to prevent vessels and/or
aircraft ofall nations, enemy as well as neutral, from entering or exiting specified
ports, airfields, or coastal areas belonging to, occupied by, or under the control of
an enemy nation. 128 A belligerent's purpose in establishing a blockade is to deny
the enemy the use of enemy and neutral vessels or aircraft to transport personnel
and goods to or from enemy territory. While the belligerent right of visit and
search is designed to interdict the flow of contraband goods, the belligerent right
of blockade is intended to prevent vessels and aircraft, regardless of their cargo,
from crossing an established and publicized cordon separating the enemy from
.
. al waters andor
/aIrspace.
'
129
mternabon
7.7.2 Traditional Rules. In order to be valid under the traditional rules of
international law, a blockade must conform to the following criteria. 130
7.7.2.1 Establishment. A blockade must be established by the government of
the belligerent nation. This is usually accomplished by a declaration of the
belligerent government or by the commander of the blockading force acting on
behalf of his government. 131 The declaration should include, as a minimum, the

126. NWIP 10-2, para. 502 n. 8, 502b(5) & nn. 14-15; Tucker 333, 355 & n. 62; 11
Whiteman 3-5.
127. NWIP 10-2, para. 502b(5) & nn. 14-15; Tucker 333 & 342.
128. NWIP 10-2, para. 502 n. 8; Tucker 354-55; Green 170-72.
129. 10 Whiteman 861-64.
130. Concise statements of these criteria and the rationale for their development appear in
ICRC, Commentary (GP I) 654, para. 2094, and 2 O'Connell 1150-51. See also Mallison &
Mallison, A Survey of the International Law ofNaval Blockade, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., Feb. 1976,
at 44-53.
131. Declaration of London, Concerning the Laws of Naval Warfare, London, 26 February
1909 [hereinafter Declaration of London], art. 9, reprinted in Schindler & Toman at 846; NWIP
10-2, para. 632b; Tucker 287. A blockade may also be ordered by the U.N. Security Council
pursuant to the specific language of art. 42. It is not possible to say whether, or to what extent, a
U.N. blockade would be governed by the traditional rules. NWIP 10-2, para. 632b, at n. 30. Art.
42 has never been applied by the Security Council. For a discussion of the continuing significance
of the Declaration of London see Kalshoven, Commentary on the Declaration of London, in
Ronzitti at 257, 259-62, 274.
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date the blockade is to begin, its geographic limits, and the grace period granted
neutral vessels and aircraft to leave the area to be blockaded. 132
7.7.2.2 Notification. It is customary for the belligerent nation establishing the
blockade to notify all affected nations of its imposition. Because knowledge of
the existence of a blockade is an essential element of the offenses of breach and
attempted breach of blockade (see paragraph 7.7.4), neutral vessels and aircraft
are always entitled to notification. The commander of the blockading forces will
usually also notify local authorities in the blockaded area. The form of the
. .IS not maten·al so Iong as It
. .IS effcecnve.
. 133
non·ficanon
7.7.2.3 Effectiveness. In order to be valid, a blockade must be effective. To be
effective, it must be maintained by a surface, air, or subsurface force or other
mechanism that is sufficient to render ingress or egress of the blockaded area
dangerous. The requirement of effectiveness does not preclude temporary
absence of the blockading force, if such absence is due to stress of weather or to
some other reason connected with the blockade (e.g., pursuit of a blockade
runner). Nor does effectiveness require that every possible avenue ofapproach to
the blockaded area be covered. 134
132. Declaration of London, art. 9. Only the NCA can direct establishment of a blockade by
U.S. forces. Although it is the customary practice of nations when declaring a blockade to specifY a
period during which neutral vessels and aircraft may leave the blockaded area, there is no
uniformity with respect to the length of the period of grace. A belligerent declaring a blockade is
free to fix such a period ofgrace as it may consider to be reasonable under the circumstances. NWIP
10-2, para. 632b n. 31; Tucker 287; Alford, Modem Economic Warfare (Law and the Naval
Participant) 345-51 (U.S. Naval War College, International Law Studies 1963, No. 61, 1967).
133. Declaration of London, arts. 11 & 16; NWIP 10-2, para. 632c & n. 32; Tucker 288. See
also San Remo Manual, para. 93.
134. Declaration ofLondon, arts. 2 & 3; NWIP 10-2, para. 632d & n. 33; Tucker 288-89. One
commentator has noted that:
"Effective," in short, comes to mean sufficient to render capture probable under
ordinary weather or other similar conditions. But even on this view, due no doubt to
the fuct that the lines ofcontroversy were set before the rise ofsteampower, mines, or
submarines, aircraft and wireless communication, at least one man-o' -war must be
present. Aircraft and submarines, however, as well as mines, concrete blocks, or
other sunken obstacles, may be used as auxiliary to blockading surface vessel or
vessels. How many surface vessels, with what speed and armament, are necessary,
along with auxiliary means, and how close they must operate for effectiveness in
view of the nature of the approaches to the blockaded port, are questions of nautical
expertise in each case.
Stone 496 (footnotes omitted), quoted in NWIP 10-2, para. 632d n. 33. The presence ofat least one
surface warship is no longer an absolute requirement to make a blockade legally effective, as long as
other sufficient means are employed. See paragraph 7.7.5 (p. 393); San Remo Manual, paras.
95-97; Doswald-Beck, at 177-78.
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7.7.2.4 Impartiality. A blockade must be applied impartially to the vessels and
aircraft of all nations. Discrimination by the blockading belligerent in favor of or
against the vessels and aircraft of particular nations, including those of its own or
those of an allied nation, renders the blockade legally invalid. 135
7.7.2.5 Limitations. A blockade must not bar access to or departure from
neutral ports and coasts. 136 Neutral nations retain the right to engage in neutral
commerce that does not involve trade or communications originating in or
destined for the blockaded area.
7.7.3 Special Entry and Exit Authorization. Although neutral warships and
military aircraft enjoy no positive right of access to blockaded areas, the
belligerent imposing the blockade may authorize their entry and exit. Such
special authorization may be made subject to such conditions as the blockading
force considers to be necessary and expedient. Neutral vessels and aircraft in
evident distress should be authorized entry into a blockaded area, and
subsequendy authorized to depart, under conditions prescribed by the officer in
command of the blockading force or responsible for maintenance of the
blockading instrumentality (e.g., mines). Similarly, neutral vessels and aircraft
engaged in the carriage of qualifying relief supplies for the civilian population
and the sick and wounded should be authorized to pass through the blockade
cordon. 137
7.7.4 Breach and Attempted Breach of Blockade. Breach of blockade is
the passage of a vessel or aircraft through a blockade without special entry or exit
authorization from the blockading belligerent. Attempted breach of blockade
occurs from the time a vessel or aircraft leaves a port or airfield with the intention
of evading the blockade, and for vessels exiting the blockaded area, continues
until the voyage is completed. 138 Knowledge of the existence of the blockade is
essential to the offenses of breach of blockade and attempted breach of blockade.
135. Declaration of London, art. 5; NWIP 10-2, para. 632f & n. 35; Tucker 288 & 291; San
Remo Manual, para. 100.
136. Declaration of London, art. 18; NWIP 10-2, para. 632e; Tucker 289-90. This rule means
that the blockade must not prevent trade and communication to or from neutral ports or coasts,
provided that such trade and communication is neither destined to nor originates from the
blockaded area. It is a moot point to what extent conventions providing for free navigation on
international rivers or through international canals (see paragraph 2.3.3.1, note 36 (p. 121) and 2
Oppenheim- Lauterpacht 771-75) have been respected by blockading nations. The practice of
nations in this matter is far from clear. NWIP 10-2, para. 632e, at n. 34.
137. Declaration of London, art. 6; NWIP 10-2, para. 632h; Tucker 291-92; ICRC,
Commentary (GP I) 654, paras. 2095-96; Matheson, Remarks, paragraph 7.4.1.2, note 105
(p. 384). Compare San Remo Manual, para. 103.
138. Hall, Law of Naval Warfare 205-06 (1921).
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Knowledge may be presumed once a blockade has been declared and appropriate
notification provided to affected govemments. 139 It is immaterial that the vessel
or aircraft is at the time ofintercep,tion bound for neutral territory, ifits ultimate
destination is the blockaded area. 40 There is a presumption ofattempted breach
of blockade where vessels or ai~craft are bound for a neutral port or airfield
serving as a point of transit to the blockaded area. Capture of such vessels is
discussed in paragraph 7.10.
7.7.5 Contemporary Practice. The traditional rules of blockade, as set out
above, are for the most part customary in nature, having derived their definitive
form through the practice of maritime powers during the nineteenth century.
The rules reflect a balance between the right of a belligerent possessing effective
command of the sea to close enemy ports and coastlines to international
commerce, and the right of neutral nations to carry out neutral commerce with
the least possible interference from belligerent forces. The law of blockade is,
therefore, premised on a system of controls designed to effect only a limited
interference with neutral trade. This was traditionally accomplished by a
relatively "close-in" cordon of surface warships stationed in the immediate
vicinity of the blockaded area.
The increasing emphasis in modem warfare on seeking to isolate completely
the enemy from outside assistance and resources by targeting enemy merchant
vessels as well as warships, and on interdicting all neutral commerce with the
enemy, is not furthered substantially by blockades established in strict conformity
with the traditional rules. In World Wars I and II, belligerents of both sides
resorted to methods which, although frequently referred to as measures of
blockade, cannot be reconciled with the traditional concept of the close-in
blockade. The so-called long-distance blockade of both World Wars departed
materially from those traditional rules and were justified instead upon the
belligerent right of reprisal against illegal acts ofwarfare on the part of the enemy.
Moreover, recent developments in weapons systems and platforms, particularly
submarines, supersonic aircraft, and cruise missiles, have rendered the in-shore
blockade exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to maintain during anything
other than a local or limited armed conflict. 141
Notwithstanding this trend in belligerent practices (during general war) away
from the establishment of blockades that conform to the traditional rules,
blockade continues to be a useful means to regulate the competing interests of
139. Declaration ofLondon, arts. 14 & 15; NWIP 10-2, para. 632g & n. 36; Tucker 292-93.
140. NWIP 10-2, para. 632g(3); 2 O'Connell 1157. The practice of nations has rendered
obsolete the contrary provisions ofthe Declaration ofLondon, arts. 17 & 19. See paragraph 7.4.1.1
(p. 383) regarding presumption of ultimate enemy destination.
141. 2 O'Connell 1151-56; NWIP 10-2, para. 632a n. 28; Tucker 305-15. See also Goldie,
Maritime War Zones & Exclusion Zones, in Robertson at 168-71.
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belligerents and neutrals in more limited armed conflict. The experience of the
United States during the Vietnam Conflict provides a case in point. The mining
of Haiphong and other North Vietnamese ports, accomplished by the
emplacement of mines, was undertaken in conformity with traditional criteria of
establishment, notification, effectiveness, limitation, and impartiality, although
at the time the mining took place the term "blockade" was not used. 142
7.8 BELLIGERENT CONTROL OF THE IMMEDIATE AREA OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS
Within the immediate area or vicinity of naval operations, a belligerent may
establish special restrictions 143 upon the activities of neutral vessels and aircraft
and may prohibit altogether such vessels and aircraft from entering the area. The
immediate area or vicinity of naval operations is that area within which hostilities
are taking place or belligerent forces are actually operating. 144 A belligerent may
not, however, purport to deny access to neutral nations, or to close an
international strait to neutral shipping, pursuant to this authority unless another
. remams
. open to neut ral traffi c. 145
route 0 f S1·milar convemence
7.8.1 Belligerent Control of Neutral Communications at Sea. The
commanding officer of a belligerent warship may exercise control over the
communication of any neutral merchant vessel or civil aircraft whose presence in
the immediate area of naval operations might otherwise endanger or jeopardize
142. McDougal & Feliciano 493-95; Swayze, Traditional Principles of Blockade in Modern
Practice: United States Mining ofInternal and Territorial Waters of North Vietnam, 29 JAG J. 143
(1977); Clark, Recent Evolutionary Trends Concerning Naval Interdiction of Seaborne
Commerce as a Viable Sanctioning Device, 27 JAG J. 160 (1973). Compare Tucker 316-17. See 2
O'Connell 1156 (who erroneously states only three hours were allowed between notification and
activation of the minefield; actually three daylight periods were allowed). But see Levie, Mine
Warfare at Sea 151-57 (1992) who correcdy argues that the mining of North Vietnamese ports did
not constitute a blockade in the traditional sense and that it was not claimed to be a blockade by
U.S. spokesmen at the time. O'Connell (at 1156) suggests that since in conditions of general war
"close blockade is likely in the missile age to be a tactically unavailable option, and long-distance
blockade to be a politically unavailable one," the twelve-mile territorial sea "may have facilitated
naval operations in finding a compromise between close and long-distance blockade." See also
paragraph 9.2.3 (p. 443).
143. See, for example, paragraph 7.8.1 (p. 394) and note 146 (p. 395). See also San Remo
Manual, para. 146; Doswald-Beck, at 214.
144. NWIP 10-2, para. 430b & n. 17; Tucker 300-01. Belligerent control over neutral vessels
and aircraft within an immediate area of naval operations, a limited and transient claim, is based on
a belligerent's right to attack and destroy its enemy, its right to defend itselfwithout suffering from
neutral interference, and its right to ensure the security of its forces.
145. See Declaration of Paris , para. 4, reprinted in Schindler & Toman at 788; Declaration of
London, art. 1; Oxford Manual, arr. 30; NWIP 10-2, para. 632a.
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those operations. A neutral merchant ship or civil aircraft within that area that
fails to conform to a belligerent's directions concerning communications may
thereby assume enemy character and risk being fired upon or captured.
Legitimate distress communications should be permitted to the extent that the
success of the operation is not prejudiced thereby. Any transmission to an
opposing belligerent of information concerning military operations or military
forces is inconsistent with the neutral duties of abstention and impartiality and
renders the neutral vessel or aircraft liable to capture or destruction. 146

7.9 EXCLUSION ZONES AND WAR ZONES
Belligerent control of an immediate area of naval operations is to be clearly
distinguished from the belligerent practice during World Wars I and II of
establishing broad ocean areas as "exclusion zones" or "war zones" in which
neutral shipping was either barred or put at special risk. Operational
war/ exclusion zones established by the belligerents of both sides were based on
the right of reprisal against alleged illegal behavior of the enemy and were used
to justify the exercise of control over, or capture and destruction of, neutral
vessels not otherwise permitted by the rules of naval warfare. 147 Exclusion or
war zones established by belligerents in the context of limited warfare that has
characterized post-World War II belligerency at sea, have been justified, at
least in part, as reasonable, albeit coercive, measures to contain the geographic
area of the conflict or to keep neutral shipping at a safe distance from areas of
actual or potential hostilities. To the extent that such zones serve to warn
neutral vessels and aircraft away from belligerent activities and thereby reduce
their exposure to collateral damage and incidental injury (see paragraph
8.1.2.1), and to the extent that they do not unreasonably interfere with
legitimate neutral commerce, they are undoubtedly lawful. However, the
establishment ofsuch a zone does not relieve the proclaiming belligerent of the
obligation under the law of armed conflict to refrain from attacking vessels and
aircraft which do not constitute lawful targets. 148 In short, an otherwise

146. NWIP 10-2, para. 520a; Tucker 300; 1923 Hague Radio Rules, art. 6, 17 Am. J. Int'l L.
Supp. 242-45 (1923) (text), 32 id.2-11 (1938) (text and conunentary), Schindler & Toman 208
(text).
147. See Tucker 301-17.
148. See San Remo Manual, paras. 105-108. As to when enemy merchant vessels and civil
aircraft constitute lawful targets, see paragraph 8.2.2 (p. 408). Rules pertaining to the permissible
targeting of neutral merchant vessels and civil aircraft that have acquired enemy character, have
resisted visit and search, or have attempted to breach blockade, are addressed in paragraphs 7.5
(p. 385), 7.6 (p. 387) and 7.7.4 (p. 392), respectively. See also discussion of the Iran-Iraq War and
the war zones proclaimed by the two belligerents in De Guttry & Ronzitti, paragraph 7.2, note 12
(p. 367) at 133-38.
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protected platfonn does not lose that ,&rotection by crossing an imaginary line
1
drawn in the ocean by a belligerent.

7.10 CAPTURE OF NEUTRAL VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT
150
Neutral merchant vessels and civil aircraft
are liable to capture by
belligerent warships and military aircraft if engaged in any of the following
activities:
. 151
1 . A VOl·eling an attempt to establiSh I·dentIty

.. VISit
.. and search 152
2 . R eSlstmg
3. Carrying contraband

153

4. Breaking or attempting to break blockade

154

5. Presenting irregular or fraudulent papers; lacking necessary papers; or
.
d efa cmg,
.
d estroymg,
or conce ali ng papers 155

149. In assessing Iran's proclaimed "exclusion zone" during the Iran/Iraq Tanker War
(1980-88), McNeill stated that:
[I]ntemational law has never legitimized attacks upon neutral merchant vessels
simply because they ventured into a specified area of the high seas .... Iran's attempts
to deny "responsibility for merchant ships failing to comply" with [the Iranian
proclaimed exclusion zone] could not operate to excuse Iran from its legal
obligations to avoid attacks on protected vessels wherever located ....
McNeill, Neutral Rights and Maritime Sanctions: The Effect of Two GulfWars, 31 Va.]. Int'lL.
631, 636 (1991).
For a detailed examination of this subject see Fenrick, The Exclusion Zone Device in the
Law of Naval Warfare, 24 Can. Y.B. Int'l L. 91 (1986) and Goldie, Maritime War Zones &
Exclusion Zones, in Robertson at 156-204. See also Russo, Neutrality at Sea in Transition: State
Practice in the Gulf War as Emerging International Law, 19 Ocean Dev. & Int'l L. 381, 389-92,
396 (1988) and Leckow, The Iran-Iraq Conflict in the Gulf: The Law of War Zones, 37 Int'l &
Compo L.Q. 629 (1988). Compare San Remo Manual, paras. 105 & 106; Doswald-Beck, at
181-83.
150. See paragraph 7.5.1, note 112 (p. 386) fora discussion of how the rules may be applied to
neutral civil aircraft engaging in unneutral service.
151. NWIP 10-2, para. 503d(5); Tucker 336. See also 11 Whiteman 30-38 for a discussion of
resistance and evasion.
152. NWIP 10-2, para. 503d(5). See paragraph 7.6 (p. 387).
153. NWIP 10-2, para. 503d(1). Exceptions may exist when the owner of the vessel is
unaware that some or all of the cargo being carried on his vessel was contraband. Tucker 295; 2
0' Connell 1148-49 . See paragraph 7.4.1 (p. 381) f~r a discussion ofwhat constitutes contraband.
154. NWIP 10-2, para. 503d(2). See paragraph 7.7.4 (p. 392).
155. NWIP 10-2, para. 503d(6); Tucker 338 n. 14.
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6. Violating regulations established by a belligerent within the inunediate area of
.
156
nav al operatlons
7. Carrying personnel in the military or public service of the enemy157
· · · n f1 cormatlon
. .In the mterest
.
0 fth e enemy. 158
8 . C ommurucattng

Captured vessels and aircraft are sent to a port or airfield under
belligerent jurisdiction as prize for adjudication by a prize court.
Ordinarily, a belligerent warship will place a prize master and prize crew on
board a captured vessel for this purpose. Should that be impracticable, the
prize may be escorted into port by a belligerent warship or military aircraft.
In the latter circumstances, the prize must obey the instructions of its escort
159
or risk forcible measures.
(Article 630.23 of OPNAVINST 3120.32
(series), Standard Organization and Regulations of the U.S. Navy, sets forth
the duties and responsibilities of commanding officers and prize masters
concerning captured vessels.)
Neutral vessels or aircraft attempting to resist proper capture lay themselves
open to forcible measures by belligerent warships and military aircraft and
160
assume all risk of resulting damage.

7.10.1 Destruction of Neutral Prizes. Every reasonable effort should be
made to avoid destruction of captured neutral vessels and aircraft. A capturing
officer, therefore, should not order such destruction without being entirely
satisfied that the prize can neither be sent into a belligerent port or airfield nor, in
161
his opinion, properly be released.
Should it become necessary that the prize
156. NWIP 10-2, para. 503d(7). See paragraph 7.8 (p. 394).
157. NWIP 10-2, para. 503d(3); Tucker 325-30.
NonnaJly, a neutral merchant vessel is not considered liable to capture for the acts enumerated in
examples 7 and 8 of paragraph 7.10 if, when encountered at sea, it is unaware of the opening of
hostilities, or if the master, after becoming aware of the opening of hostilities, has not been able to
disembark those passengers who are in the military or public service of a belligerent. A vessel is
deemed to know of the state ofarmed conflict ifit left an enemy port after the opening of hostilities,
or ifit left a neutral port after a notification of the opening of hostilities had been made in sufficient
time to the nation to which the port belonged. However, actual knowledge is often difficult or
impossible to establish. Because ofthe existence ofmodem means ofcommunication, a presumption
ot knowledge may be applied in all doubtful cases. The final detemlination of this question properly
can be left to the prize court. NWIP 10-2, para. 503d n. 25; Tucker 13, 263 & 325.
158. Tucker 336-37 & n. 11.
159. Tucker 345 n. 36 and accompanying text.
160. Tucker 336-37 & n. 11.
161. Compare San Remo Manual, para. 151. It should be noted that paragraph 7.10.1 refers to
destruction of neutral merchant vessels whose capture for any of the acts mentioned in paragraph
7.10 has already been effected. Paragraph 7.10.1 does not refer to neutral merchant vessels merely
under detention and directed into port for visit and search; such vessels are not prizes.
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be destroyed, the capturing officer must provide for the safety of the passengers
and crew. 162 In that event, all documents and papers relating to the prize should
be saved. 163 If practicable, the personal effects of passengers should also be
safeguarded. 164
7.10.2 Personnel of Captured Neutral Vessels and Aircraft. The officers
and crews of captured neutral merchant vessels and civil aircraft who are
nationals of a neutral nation do not become prisoners of war and must be
repatriated as soon as circumstances reasonably permit. This rule applies equally
to the officers and crews of neutral vessels and aircraft which have assumed the
character of enemy merchant vessels or aircraft by operating under enemy
control or resisting visit and search. If, however, the neutral vessels or aircraft had
taken a direct part in the hostilities on the side of the enemy or had served in any
way as a naval or military auxiliary for the enemy, it thereby assumed the
character of an enemy warship or military aircraft and, upon capture, its officers
d
·
·
an d crew may b e mteme
as pnsoners
0 f war. 165
Enemy nationals found on board neutral merchant vessels and civil aircraft as
passengers who are actually embodied in the military forces of the enemy, who
are en route to serve in the enemy's armed forces, who are employed in the
public service of the enemy, or who may be engaged in or suspected ofservice in
the interests of the enemy may be made prisoners of war. All such enemy
nationals may be removed from the neutral vessel or aircraft whether or not there
is reason for its capture as a neutral prize. Enemy nationals not falling within any
. are not sub·~ect to capture or d
· 166
o f these categones
etentJ.on.

162. See paragraph 8.2.2.2 (p. 410) and accompanying notes. The obligations laid down in the
London Protocol of 1936, insofar as they apply to neutral merchant vessels and aircraft, remain
valid, exception being made only for those neutral merchant vessels and aircraft performing any of
the acts enumerated in paragraphs 7.5.1 (p. 386), 7.5.2 (p. 387) and 7.8 (p. 394). In its judgment on
Admiral Doenitz, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg found the accused guilty of
violating the London Protocol by proclaiming "operational zones" and sinking neutral merchant
vessels entering those zones. The Tribunal noted that:
[T]he protocol made no exception for operational zones. The order ofDoenitz to
sink neutral ships without warning when found within these zones was, therefore, in
the opinion of the Tribunal, a violation of the protocol.

u.s. Naval War College, International Law Documents 1946-1947, No. 45, at300 (1948). See also
paragraph 7.9 (p. 395). The San Remo Manual, para. 140, would prohibit the sinking of a
passenger vessel, carrying only passengers, in such circumstances.
163. London Protocol, art. 22; Tucker 325; San Remo Manual, para. 151(b).
164. NWIP 10-2, para. 503e; San Remo Manual, para. 151(c).
165. Hague XI, arts. 5 & 8; NWIP 10-2, art. 513a & n. 40. See also San Remo Manual, para.
166. Auxiliaries are defined in paragraph 2.1.3 (p. 112).
166. GPW, art. 4A; Hague XI, art. 6; NWIP 10-2, art. 513b & n. 41.
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7.11BELLIGERENT PERSONNEL INTERNED BY A NEUTRAL
GOVERNMENT
International law recognizes that neutral territory, being outside the region of
war, offers a place of asylum to individual members of belligerent forces and as a
general rule requires the neutral government concerned to prevent the return of
such persons to their own forces. The neutral nation must accord equal
treatment to the personnel of all the belligerent forces. 167
Belligerent combatants taken on board a neutral warship or military aircraft
beyond neutral waters must be interned. 168 Belligerent civilians taken on
board a neutral warship or military aircraft in such circumstances are to be
repatriated.
With respect to aircrews of non-medical belligerent aircraft that land in
neutral territo~, whether intentionally or inadvertently, the neutral nation must
intern them. 16

167. Hague V, art. 11; Hague XIII, arts. 9&24;Tucker242&n. 97. See paragraph 7.3 (p. 370).
168. During the Iran-Iraq Tanker War, U.S. forces rescued 26 crewmembers who abandoned
the Iranian minelayer IRAN AJR following the TF 160 MH-60A helicopter attacks of 21
September 1987 while the IRAN AJR was laying mines in international waters off Bahrain. Five
days later they were handed over to Omani Red Crescent officials and shortly thereafter were
rurned over to Iranian officials, along with the remains of three others killed in the attack on the
IRAN AJR. See De Guttry&Ronzitte, paragraph 7.2 note 12 (p. 367). On 8 October1987, U.S.
Navy SEALs rescued six Iranian Revolutionary Guardsmen overboard from Iranian small craft that
had been attacked following their firing at three trailing Army helicopters about 15 NM southwest
of Farsi Island, two ofwhomsubsequendy died on board USS RALEIGH. They, and the bodies of
the dead, were similarly rerurned to Iran. 1987 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 650. It is unknown whether
Iraq consented to these arrangements, as contemplated by GWS-Sea, art. 17(1); in any event it does
not appear that Iraq objected to these actions ~hich seem to be inconsistent with the requirements
ofGWS-Sea, art. 15; Hague XIII, art. 24; and Hague V, art. 11, to intern them for the duration of
the conflict.
169. Hague V, art. 11; Draft 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare, art. 42; AFP 110-31, para.
2-6c; Tucker 251-52; 2 Levie, The Code of International Armed Conflict 807.
On 31 August 1987, in the course of escorting U.S. flag tankers, USS GUADALCANAL rescued
an Iraqi fighter pilot downed by an Iranian air-to-air missile in international waters of the Persian
Gul£ While apparendy inconsistent with GWS-Sea, art. 15, he was repattiated through officials of
the Saudi Arabian Red Crescent Society. N.Y. Times, 2 Sep. 1987, atA6; Washington Post, 2 Sep.
1987, at A18. Although the siruation never arose, the United States advised Iran during the 1991
GulfWar that in light ofU.N. S.C. Resolution 678 which called upon all U.N. membernations to
"provide appropriate support" for coalition actions, and despite Iran's declaration of"neutrality" in
that conflict, Iran would be obligated to rerum coalition aircraft and aircrew (rather than intern
them) that might be downed in Iranian territory. Tide V Report, App. 0, p. 628. This again
illustrates the modified narure ofneutrality in circumstances where the Security Counsel has issued
binding resolutions. See paragraph 7.2.1 (p. 368).
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